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Abstract
This paper analyses the relation between political uncertainty and the Peso Problem in
emerging markets. Initially, it is assumed that the country has a hard peg system (the pre-
sent government will never devalue). As for the political opposition, however, it is open to
the possibility of leaving the fixed regime when it comes to power. Assuming that the
change of government follows a Poisson distribution, our model shows that the expecta-
tions of a devaluation under the subsequent new government may drive up country risk
premium under the first government. Sovereign spreads in Argentina in 2001 are used to
illustrate the argument.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la relación entre la incertidumbre política y el Peso Problem en mer-
cados emergentes. Inicialmente, se asume que el país tiene un sistema de tipo de cambio
fijo y que el gobierno actual nunca devaluará. Por otro lado, la oposición política está
abierta a la posibilidad de dejar el régimen fijo si es que toma el poder en el futuro. Si se
asume que el cambio del gobierno sigue una distribución de Poisson, nuestro modelo
demuestra que las expectativas de una devaluación futura bajo el nuevo gobierno pueden
inducir un incremento en el riesgo país bajo el primer gobierno. La situación de la Argen-
tina en 2001 se utiliza para ilustrar el argumento.
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1. Introduction
In emerging market countries, political uncertainty is not uncommon: in particular, the
transfer of political power is not always subject to normal terms of election. In these cir-
cumstances, market expectations must not only take into account the policy of the present
government, but also incorporate future decisions of its potential successor. This could
increase country risk even when the first government is fully committed to a pegged
exchange rate, particularly if the succeeding government is known to be considering deva-
luation and strategic default.
This paper develops a model suitable for situations of political uncertainty and subs-
tantial dollarisation -both pervasive factors in emerging markets. The former has been stu-
died by Alesina et al. (1996), who define “political instability as the propensity of a govern-
ment collapse”. Dollarisation of sovereign debt has been at the centre of the debate on the
original sin (Eichengreen & Hausmann 1999).
In the present model it is assumed that the country under analysis has two possible
governments with different policy preferences: the existing government is fully committed
to maintaining the peg, and the succeeding government is not. Market expectations of a
change of government can undermine the effectiveness of a policy-maker fully committed
to the fixed exchange regime. Hence sovereign spreads can arise. This paper provides an
explicit pricing of such risk when political instability is given exogenously.
The Argentine crisis of 2001 is used to illustrate the argument. The country was in a
fixed exchange rate regime with a policy-maker committed to not default: Mr Cavallo.
Nevertheless, during 2001 the country suffered high country risk and a deep financial cri-
sis. This paper explains why a government fully committed to maintaining a peg coexisted
with high country risk.
The paper is organised in three sections. The next section introduces the basic model.
Using backward induction, section 3 describes the behaviour of the optimising policy-maker
under the succeeding government and its consequent country risk premium. Section 4
reports in which way this premium increases country risk under the first government
through the expected (random) switch of government. Finally, we draw some conclusions.
2. The Model
Following Ozkan & Sutherland (1998) we assume that output is determined by global
demand conditions, interest rates and the exchange rate. To tailor their model to fit the
description of devaluation and default in a highly dollarised economy, we assume that all
debts were contracted in US dollars, and all these debts would be pesified after devaluation
and default.
Specifically, output is determined as follows:
(2.1)
where yt is the output gap (supply minus demand) measured as percentage of GDP, p is the
price discount associated with external debt (the country risk), xt is the global fundamen-
tals (e.g., global slowdown in demand), s is the price of a dollar, all in logs except p. Initially,
with one peso to the dollar, s is equal to zero. Output is normalised so that, if there is no
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country risk (pt=0) and external shocks (xt=0), there will be no output gap at the pegged
exchange rate, i.e., demand will match supply.
Let the discount of local dollar debt relative to US equivalent be a proxy for the country
risk:1
(2.2)
where c is the coupon (measured in $US) on the unit debt, r is the US interest rate (and so
c/r measures the par value of the long maturity debt). The average price of debt is given by
v=V/D with D being the fixed amount of the country’s debt in dollars and V its value. If the
coupon payments of c are expected to be honoured at all times, then with foreign rates
constant, the debt price will stand at par (i.e., v=c/r); but anticipated reduction of coupon
payments (through debt restructuring or default) will lower bond values below par and lead
to a country risk premium which affects GNP as bond values are reflected in domestic inte-
rest rates.
It is assumed that the country is initially on a fixed exchange rate (where s is norma-
lised to zero). The key exogenous factor driving output is ‘global fundamentals’ as measu-
red by the variable xt , assumed to follow a Brownian motion:
(2.3)
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion and r is the instantaneous standard deviation.
This variable includes effects of world business cycle and the competitive pressures exer-
ted by trade partners: in the Argentinean case, for example, the country was subject to
substantial negative shocks due to the slow-down in Latin America, devaluation of the Bra-
zilian Real and the initial weakness of the Euro against the dollar.
If devaluation occurs, a floating exchange rate regime will be adopted. In this case,
following Ozkan and Sutherland, it is assumed that the exchange rate acts so as to off-set
external shocks. Thus with the floating exchange rate s=xt /c, the last two terms of (2.1)
will cancel out. To simplify the treatment, we assume further that (i) no revaluation is pos-
sible, and (ii) devaluation will be accompanied by partial default as dollar debt is ‘pesified’,
i.e., converted to peso at devalued rate. With external shocks being stabilised by s and all
debts reduced and pesified, country risk will become zero. Hence output will remain at full
employment, i.e. y=0. We are assuming that an FDR type of policy would have delivered
economic recovery.
To capture the experience of a country with high political instability, we introduce the
following sequence of events characterising the change of governments. Let the first
government be completely committed, and will never choose to devalue because of the
high costs it associates with devaluation. The fall of the first government is represented by
a Poisson event with an arrival rate of k per unit time. The probability that the first govern-
ment loses its power at time t follows an exponential distribution with density function of
ke-kt. The subsequent government has less commitment to the peg because it has a sma-
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1. In the case of partial default, v = c/r ’ < c/r, where r ’ (r ’ > r) is the effective interest rate in the market when default is anticipa-
ted. The country risk is normally defined as ∆r ≡ r ’ - r , and this paper uses c/r - v = ∆r/(∆r + r), a monotonic transformation of
the country risk.
ller perceived cost of devaluation. If the external shock is large, the new government will
choose to devalue. Since the first government never devalues, we only consider the deva-
luation decision under the new government.
We assume that the new government’s objective is to minimise expected squared
deviations of output from full employment, and that a cost of C(x) is incurred if the govern-
ment decides to devalue. To capture various different costs of devaluation, we assume in
particular that
(2.4)
where F indicates a fixed cost and the proportional part, lx, captures the case where per-
ceived costs may be state-dependent, indicating perhaps the difficulties of reaching politi-
cal consensus and legal agreement after the devaluation.
Since the floating exchange rate regime is assumed to restore output to its full employ-
ment level, the output losses after devaluation will be zero. Under these conditions, the loss
function of the new government is specified as
(2.5)
where xt indicates initial shocks, s the time for devaluation, q the new government’s time
preferences and Et the expectations operator, conditional on time t.
In what follows, we first study the behaviour of interest rates (and so country risk) and
national output under the second government given the decision to leave an exchange rate
peg when external shocks reach a critical level of xE, known to the markets. Then, there
follows the ‘political economy analysis’ where the decision to leave is made by optimising
policy-makers who care about output stabilisation, subject to a time consistency cons-
traint. In all cases, we assume that the decision to abandon the fixed rate regime is irrever-
sible and involves a cost specified in (2.4). In section 4, we look at how anticipated devalua-
tion and default under the second government can generate country risk premium under
the current ruling government even if it is fully committed to the peg.
3. Devaluation and Default
3.1. Country Risk under Fully Anticipated Devaluation
Under the second government, devaluation occurs at a pre-determined external shock
trigger at xE, and after the collapse of the peg, one dollar of debt is converted into one peso.
Let g indicate the reduction in the par value of the debt in the event of devaluation. At the
trigger xE, devaluation is given by s(xE)=xE/c, then the debt is reduced to g(xE )=e-s(xE) of
its par value. If x > xE, the devaluation and debt reduction are simply given by s(x)=x / c and
g(x)=e-x.
Let the average debt price v be a function of global fundamentals, xt. The arbitrage con-
dition for v implies
(3.1.1)
Applying Ito’s lemma to (3.1.1) yields the following 2nd order ordinary differential
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equation
(3.1.2)
which permits a general symmetric solution
(3.1.3)
where f = √2r/r2 and A1 and A2 are constants to be determined.
Since devaluation is irreversible, a value matching condition is required for the price of
the debt at the devaluation trigger
(3.1.4)
As no revaluation is possible, debt value will approach its par as for favourable funda-
mentals, i.e. xg -∞,
(3.1.5)
Applying (3.1.4) and (3.1.5) to (3.1.3) yields
(3.1.6)
The above equation shows that the devaluation trigger xE has two opposite effects on
the price of debt when x ≤ xE: the default effect represented by the term (1-e-xE/c) and the
discounting effect by ef(x - xE). Given an initial x, higher xE leads to larger devaluation and
so a larger reduction in debt value, but higher xE also implies that it takes longer to reach
this trigger, resulting in a higher discounting of such reduction.
Given devaluation and default occurring at xE, (3.1.6) and (6.2) determine the country
risk under the peg:
(3.1.7)
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Figure 1: Adverse fundamentals and the price discount
From (3.6) and (2.1), the resulting output gap is given by
(3.1.8)
When the devaluation (revaluation) trigger is given, the debt valuation function deri-
ved above is shown as an inverted S-shape curve SS in Figure 1 where x is measured on
the horizontal axis. As x goes above zero, the country risk premium increases sharply. At
the point of devaluation (and revaluation), value matching conditions apply. So, dollar
bonds which are to be pesified at a rate of 2 pesos to the dollar on devaluation, for exam-
ple, will fall to half their par value as x approaches xE.
3.2.Time Consistent Devaluation and Default
The time consistent devaluation and default trigger under the second government is
determined as follows: given public expectations of devaluation and default at xE, the
government chooses its trigger xQ so as to minimise the losses of (2.5) subject to the cost
of abandoning the peg (2.4); then, the time consistent equilibrium is obtained when xQ= xE
is imposed.
For x ≤ xQ, the Feynman-Kac formula implies that the loss function W(x) in (2.5) is a
solution to the following ordinary differential equation
(3.2.1)
which permits the general solution
(3.2.2)
where  a = ac/(rc), n = √2q/r2, B1 and B2 are two constants to be determined (assuming
q ≠ r and q ≠ 4r). In the absence of devaluation and default, country risk disappears and the
losses are simply given by WN (x)= x2/q + r2/q2.
To determine B1 and B2, two things are worth noting: first, that no revaluation is allo-
wed (xQ ≥ 0), and second that the trigger xQ is optimally chosen. No revaluation implies an
asymptotic condition of
(3.2.3)
This requires B2=0. No revaluation also implies two distinct cases for the optimal trig-
ger xQ: either xQ has an interior solution of xQ > 0, or  xQ = 0. In the case of an interior solu-
tion, irreversibility of the decision to float and the optimality of the trigger xQ imply the
following value matching and smooth pasting conditions (Dixit & Pindyck 1994)2:
(3.2.4)
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2. Note that value matching and smooth pasting conditions are necessary but not sufficient for the interior solution to be a Nash equi-
librium. We show this formally in Appendix A.
Eliminating B1 and imposing time consistency yield an equilibrium trigger xE as a solu-
tion to the equation
(3.2.5)
where K = n(F - r2/q2) - l. In the case of no interior solution (so xQ = 0), one imposes only
(3.2.4).
The following propositions characterise the equilibrium triggers of devaluation and
default for differing parameter restrictions.
Proposition 1
Let K*= minx ≥ 0 φ(x). If  a + ln a ≤ 5 - ln 2 + 1/[c(n+ f)] then:
(1) for K < K*, xE = 0;
(2) for K > K*, there is unique consistent devaluation and default trigger xE>0.
This trigger has the comparative static property ∂xE /∂F > 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Given that external debt has a very long maturity (c/r close to 1), Proposition 1 charac-
terises cases where the effect of country risk on output can be up to at least more than four
times larger than that of the exchange rates. For cases where country risk effect is even lar-
ger, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2
If ql /2 + 1 /n ≤ ( a+ln a+9/4+ln 2) c, time consistent triggers have the same characteriza-
tion as in Proposition 1.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Relaxing restriction imposed in Proposition 1, Proposition 2 suggests that the unique-
ness of the devaluation and default trigger can still be retained as long as the proportional
cost for floating the exchange rate is not excessive. Although parameter restrictions impo-
sed in both Propositions 1 and 2 are quite reasonable, they do require that costs associated
with devaluation and default are moderate. For the case of extremely high costs, we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 3
For cases other than those described in Proposition 1 and 2, there may exist two time con-
sistent devaluation and default triggers. Let K1< K2 be the two local minimum, and K3 be
the local maximum of φ(xE), then
(1) for K < K1 , xE = 0 ;
(2) for  K2 < K < K3, there is a unique equilibrium xE with ∂xE /∂F
Proof: see Appendix C.
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Results in Proposition 3 very much resemble those in Obstfeld (1996). When the cost of
floating is small, devalue and default at a first possible instance. When the cost of floating
is large, normal option value implies a delayed devaluation and default. Multiple equilibria
occur when the cost is intermediate. In this case, expectations of early floating reduce the
option value of delay and result in actual early devaluation; and similarly for expectations
of late devaluation.
4. Country Risk Premium and the Peso Problem
Note that the political instability and expectations of a subsequent new government to
devalue, if output gap is sufficiently large, may drive up country risk premium under the
current government. By taking as given the subsequent government’s decision to devalue
and default, we derive country risk under the current ‘tough’ government and assess how
political instability can impact on such premium.
Let t be the random time at which the current government is taken over by a subse-
quent ‘weak’ government who will devalue. Following the assumptions made in section 2,
the current value of dollar debt is
(4.1)
where v(xt ;xE) is the value of debt under the new government (as in (3.1.6)), Ez is the expec-
tations operator over the Brownian motion and Ek the expectations operator over take-over
random time t. The first term represents the discounted coupon payments under the current
government, and the second the discounted debt value when the new government takes over.
For an initial external shock of x(0)=x, (2.3) has a solution xt = x + rZt where Zt is nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and variance t. Given t follows an exponential distribu-
tion with density of ke-kt, we can rewrite (4.1) as
(4.2)
The expected coupon payments under the current government are simply discounted
by an effective rate which incorporates the probability that the current government can
fall. We relegate the computation of the second term in Appendix D.
Let Z=(xE -x) /r, one can show that the debt price is given by
(4.3)
where g1(xE) = 1 - (1-e-xE/c)/(1- fr/√2(k + r)) - e-xE/c/[1 + r/(c√2(k + r))]
and g2(xE) = 1 - (1-e-xE/c)/(1+ fr/√2(k + r)) - e-xE/c/[1 - r/(c√2(k + r))]. The resulting
country risk (price discount) is
(4.4)
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ˆ

where the first row represents country risk if the current fundamental is below the trigger
of the second government, otherwise the country risk is given by the second.
With no political instability (k=0), (4.3) shows that debt price is at par (c/r), and (4.4)
gives country risk premium of zero. The presence of political instability reduces the price
and increases country risk. When the change of the government is immediate (kg∞),
country risk under the first government is identical to that of the second (as (4.3) degene-
rates to (3.1.6) and (4.4) becomes (3.1.7)).
Figure 2 : Political instability and the peso problem
Figure 2 illustrates how country risk under the first government is determined (the
horizontal axis is the fundamental while the vertical is the country risk). Dashed curve SS
represents country risk under the second government (it is also the one for the first govern-
ment if kg∞). The horizontal axis gives the country risk for the first government if k=0.
For any given k > 0, country risk for the first government is simply a weighted average of
SS and the horizontal axis (where the weight is state dependent). Two possible country risk
profiles for the first government are drawn: HH corresponds to k = kH and LL to k= kL < kH.
Can this model account for the country risk premium evolution in Argentina before the
collapse of the Convertibility regime? Figure 2 represents the relatively low country risk of
10% (mid-2001) by point A which corresponds to low political risk. Deteriorating fundamen-
tals could account for the gradual increase of country risk (it rose to 15% in the third quar-
ter), as indicated by the movement from A to B3. It is clear that, towards the end of 2001, the
market revised upwards the exit probability of de la Rua´s regime. Interpreting this as an
increase in the parameter k, this will shift the price-discount schedule up from LL to HH.
This corresponds to a rapid increase in country risk (it jumped to 40% in the fourth quar-
ter) before the fall of de la Rua´s government.
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3.Where it is assumed that the fundamental has passed the trigger for devaluation and default of the second government, labeled xE .
Conclusions
Market expectations of a change of government can undermine the effectiveness of a
policy-maker fully committed to the fixed exchange regime. Hence sovereign spreads can
arise. This paper provided an explicit pricing of such risk when political instability is given
exogenously.
Firstly, the paper presented the basic model. Secondly, it described the behaviour of the
new government and its country risk premium associated. Finally, assuming an exogenous
given expected switch of government, the paper reported how the expected ex-post
country risk increases the ex-ante risk.
There are possibilities for interesting ways forward through endogenising the political
uncertainty (parameter lambda) into the model4. This would demand a more complex fra-
mework but would allow the model to account for the influence of bad fundamentals on
the probability of change of government. Moreover, it would give a more detailed descrip-
tion for the Argentine collapse.
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4. Another approach, suggested by the anonymous referee, is to assume that lambda is a time varying stochastic process but exogenous
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where
Appendices 
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We show first that the function φ(xE ) is strictly convex under the given assumptions.
Using the fact that φ is initially strictly decreasing and then increasing, we establish inte-
rior time consistent solutions and their comparative static properties. Finally, we show that
xE= 0 if the devaluation and default cost is relatively low. For a simple exposition, we drop
the subscript of x.
For φ´ (´x) > 0, it is equivalent to have
(6.1)
Function u(x) is strictly convex and has a unique minimum at
(6.2)
If a ≤ a*, φ(x) is strictly convex. This is because x*≤ 0, and u(x) is strictly increasing for
x ≥ 0. Since u(0) > 0, so u(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0.
If a > a*, x* > 0. Strict convexity of φ(x) now requires u(x*) ≥ 0. This translates into the
following parameter restriction
(6.3)
The first two terms on the RHS of (6.3) are decreasing in n and have a minimum of
2 - ln 2 when ng∞. So ln a + a ≤ 5 - ln 2 + 1/[c(n + f)] is sufficient for (6.3).
Since φ(x) is strictly convex, with φ´(0) < 0 and φ´(+∞) > 0, φ(x) must have a unique
minimum  K* = φ(x) and x > 0. So φ´ (x) < 0 for x ∈ [0,x), and φ´(x) > 0 for x > x.
For K* < K < 0, as φ(0) = 0 and φ(+∞)g+∞, there must be two solutions: 0 < x E´ < x and
xE > x. We show that x E´ is not a Nash equilibrium while xE is. Note that from loss function
given in (3.2.2) a minimum of W is equivalent to a minimum of B1 (as B2 = 0). Using (3.2.4)
to solve for B1 yields
(6.4)
Differentiating B1 with respect to xQ and imposing the time consistency xQ = xE gives
(6.5)
where at x E´, φ(x E´) - K = 0. The strict convexity of φ(x) implies φ´(x E´)< 0. Consider a small
reduction of xQ from x E´ (while by still imposing time consistency), this leads to an increa-
se in B1 and so the loss function. Thus x E´ is not a Nash equilibrium. Using this similar local
argument, one can show that xE is a Nash equilibrium.
To establish the comparative static property of xE, note that φ(x) is locally increasing
at xE, so ∂xE/∂F > 0.
   


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For K > 0, there is only one solution xE satisfying φ(xE) - K = 0. As φ(xE) is locally incre-
asing, so xE is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, we also have ∂xE/∂F > 0.
If K < K*, there is no interior solution. In this case, only (3.2.4) can be imposed as a
boundary condition. This results B1 as in (6.4) and its derivative with respect to the trigger
as in (6.5). For K < K* and any xE > 0, ∂B1/∂xQ |xQ=xE > 0 , so xE = 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Here we only need to show that φ(x) is initially decreasing and then increasing for




where x = ql/2 + 1/n - acn/(n+f). Differentiating w yields
(7.2)
So w(x) is strictly increasing as long as d(x) > 0 for x ≥ 0.
Function d(x) is strictly convex and has a unique stationary point at x* (as defined in
Appendix A), so d(x*) is the minimum. If a ≥ a*, x* > 0. Positive d(x) requires d(x*) > 0,
which in turn imposes the following parameter restriction
(7.3)
So given (7.3), w(x) is strictly increasing in x for x ≥ 0. As w(0) < 0 and w(+∞) > 0,
w(x) = 0 has a unique solution x, and φ´(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0,x), φ´(x) < 0 for x > x.
ˆ
  
C. Proof of Proposition 3
It is obvious from (7.1) that, for x ≥ 0, φ(x) is initially convex, then concave, and finally
convex. At the most φ(x) can have two local minima K1 < K2 and one local maximum K3.
For K2 < K < K3, φ(x) - K = 0 has four zeros: two of which occur when φ´(x) < 0 (so ruled out
for Nash equilibria) and the other two with φ´(x) > 0 (so they constitute Nash equilibria).
The rest of the proof follows exactly as in Appendix A.
D. Country Risk Premium under the First Government
Denote the second term in (4.3) by I, then
(9.1)
Using the formula
(Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 1994, 3.325, p355), (9.1) becomes
(9.2)
Some straightforward integrations for different cases of Z yield (4.3) in the text.
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ˆ
